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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers cases present a 
number of problems for scholars. The most obvious problem is the 
absence of a consistent methodology. The Court’s opinions appear to 
wander somewhat aimlessly, without a coherent approach to the 
structural Constitution.1 At times, the Court uses a formal and textual 
analysis hostile to legislative innovations dealing with the structure 
and powers of the branches.2 At other times, the Court relies on a 
more functional balancing analysis that welcomes Congress’s 
legislative creativity about power distribution.3 
One finds additional inconsistencies in the way the Court has 
treated the different branches, especially when it comes to statutes 
that expand the powers of a particular branch. The Court rigorously 
polices limitations on the powers of the federal courts,4 and becomes 
even stricter when the question involves a statutory expansion of 
Congress’s authority.5 The Court has found it difficult, however, to 
develop an effective approach to limiting the statutory expansion of 
presidential power, particularly when expanded through delegations 
of quasi-legislative power.6 As a result, many scholars criticize the 
 
Copyright © 2017 Todd David Peterson. 
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 1.  See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1513, 1517 (1991). The structural Constitution refers to the provisions that ordain and 
establish the powers of the three branches, particularly Articles I, II, and III. 
 2.  See infra text accompanying notes 63–66. 
 3.  See infra text accompanying notes 53–56. 
 4.  See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
 5.  See infra text accompanying notes 48–54. 
 6.  See infra text accompanying notes 84–93. 
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Court’s separation of powers cases for unduly limiting Congress’s 
ability to redress the shift in power to the executive branch that 
accompanied the expansion of the administrative state.7 In these 
cases, the Court hurts its own cause because explanations for why 
Congress may not augment its own authority have tended to be 
superficially textual and overly formalistic.8 
Although the Court does not explain itself well, it nevertheless 
captures some important truths about how the Constitution protects 
against the arbitrary exercise of federal power. The Court’s case law 
on statutory expansions of judicial and legislative power recognizes 
important procedural checks on the way that power is exercised. By 
requiring that judicial power be exercised only in the context of a 
litigated case or controversy, the Court gives effect to the framers’ 
approach to preventing the arbitrary exercise of power by judges who 
are largely immune from inter-branch checks on their authority.9 
Similarly, cases limiting the power of Congress to expand its own 
authority require that any congressional exercise of substantive power 
be exercised only through the mechanism of the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause, that is, passed by both Houses of Congress and 
sent to the President for his signature or veto.10 Such a procedural 
limitation on the exercise of congressional power ensures that the 
framers’ checks on the arbitrary exercise of legislative power may not 
be circumvented through the imaginative assignment of power to less 
than the entire Congress. 
The only problem with these cases is that the Court has not been 
able to find an analogous comprehensive constitutional procedural 
check on the executive branch. There simply is no Article II analogue 
to the case or controversy requirement of Article III or the 
bicameralism and presentment requirement of Article I.11 The Court 
has mostly been reduced to defining the limitations on statutory 
enlargement of executive power by defining what it is not—legislative 
and judicial power. As the toothless non-delegation doctrine 
 
 7.  See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so 
Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional 
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions–A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
488, 489 (1987) (arguing that, to permit the President fully to oversee administrative discretion 
is to allow the President to assume the legislative, executive, and judicial powers). 
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 135–146. 
 9.  See infra text accompanying notes 105–134. 
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 147–156. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
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demonstrates, however, this approach has not proved to be an 
effective check on the enlargement of executive power.12 As a result, 
the cases concerning statutory expansions of power look decidedly 
unbalanced, with significant procedural checks on the exercise of 
judicial and congressional power, but no comprehensive procedural 
checks on executive power. 
As a practical matter, this imbalance is more apparent than real, 
and it certainly does not warrant rethinking the procedural checks on 
the judicial and legislative branches. First, when the Court finds an 
applicable procedural check on the executive branch, it has not 
hesitated to enforce it, as it did in striking down the line item veto.13 
Second, and more importantly, Congress has stepped in to fill the gap 
by adopting the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and 
numerous other statutes that effectively create the same kinds of 
procedural checks on the exercise of power by the executive branch 
that the case or controversy and bicameralism and presentment 
requirements impose on the judicial and legislative branches.14 By 
requiring the executive branch to make and implement its policy 
decisions through a set of procedures designed to minimize the 
chances for arbitrary decision-making and abuses of authority, 
Congress and the courts (through the judicial review that is 
authorized by the APA) have corrected the imbalance in the 
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the exercise of federal 
power. If anything, as a policy matter, Congress may have gone too far 
in imposing procedural checks that have impaired the ability of the 
executive branch to implement its statutory mandates effectively.15 
 
 12.  See infra notes 157–186 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998). “The law establishes a new 
mechanism which gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target, in 
order to disfavor the group or to extract further concessions from Congress. The law is the 
functional equivalent of a line item veto and enhances the President’s powers beyond what the 
Framers would have endorsed.” Id. at 451. 
 14.  See infra text at notes 195–210. 
 15.  See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 301, 442 (2002); 
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of 
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65 (1989) (“By transferring vast power to agencies 
subservient to Congress and unfettered by substantive statutory standards, each member of 
Congress was well-positioned to become a feudal lord. Moreover, while Congress could take 
credit for addressing a problem by creating an agency to regulate that area, a legislator could 
enhance the credibility of promises of favorable agency treatment to constituents by referring to 
Congress’s power to veto an agency action or to remove the agency head.”); Patricia Wald, The 
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528 (1988); 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
212 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
Three significant normative consequences flow from this 
understanding of the importance of the APA in redressing the 
imbalance in the Court’s separation of powers case law. First, it means 
that both scholars and the courts should be sensitive to the role of the 
APA and numerous other procedural statutes as an executive-branch 
analogue to the case or controversy and bicameralism and 
presentment requirements. Second, there is little reason to reconsider 
the Court’s imposition of procedural checks on Congress and the 
federal courts simply because the Court cannot find and implement a 
comprehensive constitutional analog for the executive branch. 
Congress has effectively created analogous procedural checks through 
the APA and other statutes regulating the manner in which the 
executive branch enforces the law, and if it remains concerned about 
abuses of power by the executive branch, it retains the ability to add 
additional procedural checks on executive power. Third, because the 
legitimacy of the procedural checks on the courts and Congress 
depends in part on Congress’s power to impose similar checks on the 
executive branch, the courts should be skeptical of presidential 
arguments that such restrictions unconstitutionally impair the ability 
of the executive branch to carry out its constitutional functions. 
This article proceeds in four parts. In part one, the article lays the 
foundation for the rest of the paper by discussing the differing 
approaches taken by scholars and the Supreme Court with respect to 
the structural Constitution. Some scholars favor formalist approaches 
that emphasize strictly enforced lines of division between the 
branches, while others prefer a functionalist interpretation that allows 
for greater legislative freedom in creating structural innovations as 
long as they do not disrupt the balance of power among the branches. 
The Court’s apparent wavering between these formalist and 
functionalist approaches reflects the Court’s greater suspicion and 
greater scrutiny of statutory expansions of authority than of statutory 
restrictions on how a branch exercises its power. 
In part two, the article looks at cases limiting the statutory 
augmentation of a branch’s constitutional power. With respect to the 
judicial branch, the case or controversy requirement should be seen as 
a procedural check that is the framers’ response to concerns about the 
absence of significant inter-branch checks on the authority of federal 
 
Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 
422–25 (1987).  
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judges. The cases restricting the statutory enhancement of Congress’s 
powers recognize the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause as 
creating an analogous procedural check on how Congress exercises 
substantive power. This part then examines the Court’s failure to 
recognize a similar constitutional check on the exercise of executive 
power, the reasons for this failure, and the ways in which Congress 
might reinvigorate at least some constitutional protections against the 
arbitrary exercise of executive authority. 
In part three, the article discusses why the apparent imbalance 
between the constitutional checks on the executive as compared with 
the legislative and judicial branches is not a cause for significant 
concern because of Congress’s power to impose analogous procedural 
checks on the executive branch. Finally, in part four, the article 
concludes by arguing that the effectiveness of these congressionally 
imposed procedural checks has several important implications for the 
separation of powers. 
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence has 
grown substantially over the past thirty years and has created a 
chaotic collection of precedents that defies easy organization and 
analysis. Scholars have written innumerable law review articles 
attempting to sort through the growing number of cases and to 
impose order upon the seeming chaos of the Court’s opinions.16 These 
articles have explored the Court’s underlying methodology in a way 
that the opinions themselves usually fail to address. The Court has not 
only failed to enunciate a clear separation of powers methodology, it 
has usually failed even to acknowledge the need for such a 
methodology. 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of 
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); Paul R. Verkuil, The American 
Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law 
and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Separating 
the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987); Thomas O. Sargentich, 
The Contemporary Debate about Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 430 (1987); Strauss, supra note 7. 
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A. Scholarly Theory 
Scholars have found it as difficult as the Court to agree on a 
methodological approach to the separation of powers, but any 
discussion of the nature of scholarly disagreement begins with the 
distinction between formalism and functionalism. Formalist theory 
emphasizes the importance of separation of the branches and rests on 
the assumption that executive, legislative, and judicial powers can be 
clearly distinguished and cabined in their respective branches of 
government.17 Formalists believe the text of the Constitution provides 
discernable answers to questions involving the structural constitution, 
that those answers are fixed and do not fluctuate over time, and that 
they should be based on the drafters’ original intent.18 Thus, formalists 
believe “questions of horizontal governmental structure are to be 
resolved by reference to a fixed set of rules and not by reference to 
some purpose of those rules.”19 
By contrast, functionalist theory emphasizes the importance of 
checks and balances and of preserving the balance between the 
branches.20 Functionalists believe that the text of the structural 
Constitution is indeterminate and that it rarely provides clear answers 
to difficult questions involving the separation of powers.21 Under a 
functionalist approach, a statute is constitutional “as long as the 
policies underlying the original structure are satisfied.”22 For 
functionalists, the fluidity of the theory is its strength, and it acts as an 
antidote to the rigidity of formalism, which “tends to straitjacket the 
government’s ability to respond to new needs in creative ways, even if 
those ways pose no threat to whatever might be posited as the basis 
purposes of the constitutional structure.”23 A functional approach 
 
 17.  See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1958–61 (2011). 
 18.  Id.; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 6–10 
(1995); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1523 (1991); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. 
REV. 853, 859–60 (1990). 
 19.  M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1127, 1138 (2000). 
 20.  Manning, supra note 17, at 1952; see also Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility 
Principle, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 225, 226 (2007); Sargentich, supra note 16, at 433. 
 21.  Manning, supra note 17, at 1952; see also Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984). 
 22.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 93–94 (1995). 
 23.  Brown, supra note 1, at 1526. 
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typically involves some form of balancing test to ensure that the 
equilibrium of power is maintained.24 
Finally, it is worth noting a third approach, championed by John 
Manning, which rejects the notion that the Constitution contains any 
“freestanding separation of powers doctrine.”25 Manning emphasizes 
that the Constitution contains no separation of powers clause, but 
instead is a collection of disparate structural requirements, some 
specific and some general, which must be read in historical context 
and each interpreted separately.26 Under Manning’s approach, it is 
difficult to give the kind of weight formalists insist on giving to very 
general terms like legislative, executive, and judicial power, but crucial 
to give effect to more specific clauses such as the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Impeachment 
Clauses.27 As will be developed in Part II, this article’s emphasis on 
the importance of procedural checks to the framers’ vision of the 
separation of powers partakes more of Manning’s approach than of 
either strict formalism or the more permissive functionalist 
approach.28 
B. The Supreme Court and The Separation of Powers 
For the purpose of briefly discussing how the Supreme Court has 
addressed separation of powers issues, it is useful to divide the cases 
into three categories: (1) cases that deal with the inherent power of 
the branches, neither expanded nor restricted by statute; (2) cases that 
concern statutes that purport to restrict the inherent power of a 
branch, and (3) cases that seek to augment the inherent power of a 
branch. As Justice Jackson’s well-known concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer explains, issues of 
constitutional power depend on whether a branch is acting on the 
 
 24.  Manning, supra note 17, at 1951. Eric Posner has effectively challenged the idea that 
courts can effectively apply a balancing analysis to the power of the branches. See Eric A. 
Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, 2–5 (Chi. Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 622, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfmabstractid = 2178725. 
 25.  Manning, supra note 17, at 1950. 
 26.  Id. at 1947–50. 
 27.  Id. at 1945. 
 28.  For the purposes of this discussion, the article does not address theories that the 
Supreme Court should leave separation of powers disputes to be negotiated by the branches and 
not adjudicated by the courts. See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 260 (1980); Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
1595 (2014). 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
216 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
basis of its own inherent power or with a statutory augmentation of 
that power or with a statutory restriction on that power.29 
For example, the inherent power category includes those cases 
involving the inherent power of the branches without statutory 
augmentation or restriction. Cases involving the inherent power of the 
executive branch include In re Neagle,30 In Re Debs,31 and 
Youngstown.32 In Neagle, the Court held that the President has 
inherent power to protect officials of the federal government without 
the need for statutory augmentation.33 In Debs, the Court held that 
the President had inherent power to seek an injunction to stop a 
railroad strike that threatened to halt transportation of the United 
States mail.34 Sixty years later, in Youngstown, the Court rejected the 
President’s assertion that he had inherent authority to seize the 
nation’s steel mills when a steel strike threatened to halt steel 
production necessary to support the Korean war effort.35 Inherent 
congressional power includes both express powers, such as the 
authority to legislate concerning the subjects listed in Article I, § 8 of 
the Constitution, and the implied powers that flow from express 
authority, such as the power to subpoena witnesses and documents36 
and the power to imprison for contempt of Congress those who refuse 
to respond to congressional subpoena.37 Similarly, the inherent power 
of the federal courts includes the power of judicial review,38 the power 
to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of court,39 and the 
power to make federal common law in order to resolve disputes 
between two states.40 
In these types of cases, the Court has tended to proceed from the 
constitutional text and ask what powers must necessarily be inferred 
 
 29.  343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring). Of course, Justice Jackson was 
referring only to the power of the executive branch, but the concept can easily be applied to all 
of the branches. 
 30.  135 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 31.  158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
 32.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 33.  135 U.S. at 67. 
 34.  158 U.S. at 600. 
 35.  343 U.S. at 585. 
 36.  See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927). 
 37.  Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536–37 (1916); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 204, 227–28 (1821). 
 38.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 39.  Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987). 
 40.  See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
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from textual powers. Thus, Congress has the express textual power to 
legislate, and the implied power to compel testimony because the 
latter power is necessary for the effective implementation of the 
former power.41 The Court has most successfully drawn the 
boundaries between the inherent powers of the branches by 
determining where the general powers of one branch run into the 
more specific powers of another branch. Justice Jackson’s famous 
Youngstown concurrence persuasively argues that the President’s 
commander-in-chief power did not include the power to seize steel 
mills to halt a strike that threatened wartime weapons construction 
because the President’s power yielded to the more specific power of 
Congress to raise and support armies.42 Justice Jackson’s opinion is far 
more persuasive than Justice Black’s opinion for the Court, which 
rested on the simplistic assertion that the President’s commander-in-
chief power had to yield to Congress’s far more general power to 
legislate.43 
The second category of cases deals with Congress’s power to 
restrict the inherent authority of each of the branches through 
statutory limitations. For example, Congress may restrict the 
President’s inherent authority to remove executive branch officers,44 
or it may attempt to limit the power of the courts by restricting 
federal jurisdiction as it did in Ex parte McCardle45 and United States 
v. Klein,46 or by overturning the judgments of the federal courts in 
specific cases.47 Not surprisingly, there are no cases involving 
legislative attempts to restrict the inherent power of Congress. 
The Court tends to resolve statutory restriction cases by balancing 
Congress’s need to legislate in order to solve a particular problem 
against the legislation’s impact on the branches ability to perform its 
 
 41.  See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 161. 
 42.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (Jackson, J. 
concurring). 
 43.  See id. at 586–588. 
 44.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
 45.  See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) (holding that, while “the appellate powers of this 
court are not given by the judicial act, but are given by the Constitution,” they are, nevertheless, 
“limited and regulated by that act”). 
 46.  See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (“It is of vital importance that these powers be 
kept distinct.”). 
 47.  See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“It is the obligation of the 
last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment, 
even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, 
at every level, must ‘decide according to existing laws.’”). 
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inherent constitutional functions. For example, in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services,48 the Court reviewed a statute that 
restricted the ability of the executive branch to maintain the 
confidentiality of presidential documents. The Court stated that, in 
determining whether the statute “disrupts the proper balance 
between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the 
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing 
its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for 
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is 
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.”49 
The balancing approach taken by the Court in cases involving 
legislative restrictions on inherent constitutional authority tends to 
conform to a functionalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Thus, the Court has been relatively accepting of statutory limitations 
on inherent constitutional power and has employed a balancing test 
that eschews the creation of strict lines of demarcation between the 
branches—permitting the modification of a branch’s constitutional 
authority on a case-by-case basis. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s permissive, functional approach to 
most statutory restrictions on presidential power, recent Presidents, 
particularly George W. Bush, have relied on a strongly formalist 
theory to make controversial claims of presidential immunity from 
many statutory restrictions. Using a strongly formalist theory of 
independent executive power, President Bush issued more than a 
thousand signing statements in which he claimed that he was not 
obligated to obey statutory provisions that interfered with the 
President’s ability to control the executive branch.50 In a compilation 
assembled by Professors Neil Kinkopf and Peter Shane, the authors 
found that President Bush had issued 1070 signing statements in 
which he had objected to the unconstitutionality of one or more 
provisions of a statute, of which 380 objections were based on the 
 
 48.  433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 49.  Id. at 443 (citations omitted).  
 50.  See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 228 (2008); Sofía E. Biller, Flooded by the 
Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Hostility 
to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (2008); Neil Kinkopf, Signing 
Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 307 (2007−2008); Peter M. Shane, Presidential Signing Statements and the Rule of Law as an 
Unstructured Institution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 231 (2007–2008). 
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claim that the provision interfered with the President’s authority to 
direct the executive branch under a unitary executive theory.51 As will 
be discussed later, Congress’s strong authority to impose procedural 
checks on the President and the executive branch makes these 
presidential assertions of power highly suspect.52 
The Court has been much more skeptical of statutory expansions 
of a branch’s inherent constitutional power and has been particularly 
strict with respect to Congress’s efforts to expand its own powers. 
Thus, the Court has struck down Congress’s attempt to give itself a 
legislative veto of executive branch action,53 Congress’s attempt to 
vest itself with the power to appoint members of the Federal Election 
Commission,54 Congress’s attempt to grant the Comptroller General, 
a legislative officer, executive authority over certain aspects of the 
budget process,55 and Congress’s attempt to place its own members on 
a board with control over Washington area airports.56 The Court has 
also overturned legislation that enlarged the power of the judicial 
branch, including a statute it interpreted to expand the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,57 a statute that required the Court 
to give extra judicial advice to Congress and the Secretary of War on 
pension applications,58 and a statute that gave the federal courts 
jurisdiction over matters that do not involve a justiciable case or 
controversy.59 Finally, the Court has occasionally rejected attempts by 
Congress to expand the President’s inherent constitutional power, 
such as by granting him a form of line item veto60 and, at least in 
certain cases, granting the executive branch quasi-legislative authority 
without sufficiently clear and intelligible guidelines as to how to 
exercise it.61 In these cases, the Court has taken a much more 
 
 51.  Neil J. Kinkopf & Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of Presidential 
Signing Statements, 2001-2009 (Version 2.0), SSRN Paper No. 1748474 (2011). 
 52.  See infra text accompanying note 235. 
 53.  I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
 54.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143–44 (1976). 
 55.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986). 
 56.  Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 
U.S. 252, 277 (1991). 
 57.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 58.  Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. 408, 410 n.* (1792) (“Neither the legislative nor the executive 
branches can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, but such as are properly judicial, 
and to be performed in a judicial manner.”). 
 59.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
 60.  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). 
 61.  See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (“Those 
who act under [constitutional] grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because 
they believe that more or different power is necessary.”). Id. at 528–29; Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
220 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
formalistic approach to the constitutional separation of powers. 
Instead of balancing the impact on separation of powers values 
against the need for legislation, the Court has rigidly focused on what 
it perceived to be the clear textual limitations on Congress’s ability to 
statutorily augment the power of a particular branch. 
Notwithstanding the complaints of some scholars about the 
muddled state of the Court’s separation of power’s jurisprudence,62 
one can explain the differences in the Court’s approach by examining 
the issues presented by different separation of powers cases. The 
Court is much more likely to be flexible and functionalist in its 
approach when the issue is whether a statute inappropriately restricts 
the power of a particular branch and thus prevents it from 
accomplishing its inherent constitutional function.63 It is much more 
rigid and formalist when a statute purports to expand the power of a 
particular branch and thus risks aggrandizing a branch with power 
that might be subject to abuse.64 This is appropriate given the risks 
inherent in granting a branch too much power. 
There are several potential objections to this analysis of the cases. 
First, one could argue that there is no real difference between a 
statute that aggrandizes the power of a branch and a statute that 
purports to restrict the power of a branch since all power is relative. 
By restricting the power of one branch, Congress necessarily increases 
the power of the other branches and, therefore, might be said to 
create the risk that power may be abused just as easily as when a 
statute grants power directly to a particular branch. While it is true 
that a substantial restriction on the power of one branch might so 
unbalance the relative powers of the branches that it could create the 
risk of an abuse of authority, such a result is not nearly as likely as it is 
 
295 U.S. 330, 388 (1935). 
 62.  See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (2000); 
Brown, supra note 1, at 1517 (“Unanimity among constitutional scholars is all but unheard of. 
Perhaps when achieved it should be celebrated. But one point on which the literature has 
spoken virtually in unison is no cause for celebration: the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle.”). 
 63.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (explaining that judicial exercise of the 
power to appoint is not in any way inconsistent as a functional matter with the courts’ exercise 
of their Article III powers). 
 64.  See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“With all the obvious flaws of delay, 
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom 
than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the 
Constitution.”). 
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when Congress statutorily augments the power of one of the 
branches. 
This point is neatly illustrated by Morrison, where the Court 
upheld the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act.65 Justice Scalia argued in his dissent that the Act 
deeply wounded the president “by substantially reducing the 
President’s ability to protect himself and his staff” and that in doing 
so, it greatly increased the power of Congress.66 Yet the outcome of 
the investigation of Ted Olson that gave rise to the Supreme Court 
decision in Morrison itself illustrates the substantial difference 
between a statute that restricts the authority of a branch and one that 
aggrandizes a branch by the direct augmentation of the branch’s 
power. Attorney General Edwin Meese initiated the independent 
counsel investigation of Olson at the behest of the House Judiciary 
Committee, which claimed that Olson had lied in testifying before the 
Committee. It was quite clear that the judiciary committee sought the 
indictment and prosecution of Olson.67 If the Ethics in Government 
Act had granted to Congress the power to appoint a prosecutor and 
supervise the prosecutor’s investigation, there is little doubt that 
Olson would have been indicted and brought to trial for perjury. As it 
turned out, however, although the independent counsel’s investigation 
stretched over an unusually long period of time, Olson was not 
ultimately indicted. As a result, he not only avoided the trauma of a 
criminal trial, but he was also able to obtain reimbursement for 
almost $1.5 million in attorneys’ fees.68 
The greater danger of a direct aggrandizement of Congress as 
opposed to a mere limitation on the power of the executive branch to 
control a prosecution is evident from this example. Limiting the 
control of the President and Attorney General over an independent 
counsel creates a loss of accountability and diminishes the ability of 
the President to ensure that a prosecutor’s actions are consistent with 
the general policies of the Department of Justice. But the 
independent counsel remains a separate check upon the will of 
Congress to prosecute a particular individual. Granting the 
prosecutorial power directly to Congress, however, would have 
 
 65.  487 U.S. at 696. 
 66.  Id. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67.  See Alison Frankel, Ted Olson’s Five Years in Purgatory, AM. LAW., Dec. 1988, at 70. 
 68.  See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1) (2000). This provision expired on June 30, 1999 along with 
the rest of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994. 28 U.S.C. § 599. 
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removed that check and permitted Congress to carry out a political 
vendetta against anyone who incurred the wrath of a particular 
committee. Such an aggrandizement of Congress’s authority thus 
poses a far greater risk to individual liberty than does a statutory 
limitation on the President’s supervisory power.69 
For example, in Chadha, the Supreme Court declared that a one-
house legislative veto was inconsistent with the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses of the Constitution.70 Chadha involved a 
legislative veto of a decision by the Attorney General to suspend the 
deportation of an illegal alien. The Court determined that the veto of 
the executive branch action was legislative in nature and, as 
legislation, was subject to the requirement for bicameral passage and 
presentment to the President for his signature or veto.71 The Court’s 
approach, as many have noted,72 was extremely formalistic and relied 
on the determinacy of text that is not necessarily clear. Moreover, the 
Court’s conclusion that the legislative veto of the suspension of 
Chadha’s deportation was a legislative act because it “had the purpose 
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of 
persons . . . outside the legislative branch,”73 seems dramatically over 
broad. That definition of legislative action might sweep within it much 
of the delegated authority exercised by the executive branch as well, 
including the very suspension of deportation that was at issue in 
Chadha.74 The stiff and wooden analysis of the Court is apparent from 
the absence of any discussion concerning why Congress’s grant of this 
authority to itself created an accumulation of power that threatened 
the underlying principles of the structural separation of powers in the 
Constitution. 
 
 69.  The only way to restrict or enlarge that constitutional authority is through the passage 
of a duly authorized statute. It is not enough for Congress simply to acquiesce in the exercise of 
power by another branch; to expand the branch’s authority beyond that which is given by the 
Constitution it is necessary for Congress to adopt a statute. Similarly, a formally adopted statute 
is the only way to restrict the authority that a branch would otherwise have under the 
Constitution. Congress can neither expand nor restrict the other branches in any manner other 
than through the passage of legislation. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
 71.  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952–57. 
 72.  See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bath Water? A Comment on the 
Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (1983) (criticizing Chadha); 
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminancy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 476 (1989); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers 
Jurisprudence is so Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989); Strauss, supra note 7, at 
489. 
 73.  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. 
 74.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214−17 (3d ed. 2000). 
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That conclusion does not mean there are no justifications for the 
Court’s holding. Scholars have subsequently argued that the result in 
Chadha was appropriate,75 and as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, this article argues that Chadha can properly be seen as part of 
a consistent series of cases attempting to control the abuse of 
legislative authority by limiting the procedural mechanism through 
which Congress can act substantively.76 At present, it is sufficient to 
note that we must at least ask the question whether the grant of a 
legislative veto threatened an aggrandizement of legislative power.77 
A similar pattern played out in Bowsher v. Synar in which the 
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (popularly known as the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).78 In particular, the Court focused on 
the statute’s assignment of certain duties, including ensuring a 
balanced budget, to the Comptroller General, the head of the General 
Accounting Office and an officer of Congress. The Court concluded 
that 
by placing the responsibility for execution of the . . . Act in the 
hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, 
Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the 
Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution 
does not permit such intrusion.79  
 
 75.  See Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha and the 
104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319–20 (1997); Stanley C. Brubaker, Slouching 
Toward Constitutional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1 CONST. 
COMMENT. 81, 93–94 (1984). 
 76.  See infra text accompanying notes 139–156. 
 77.  The importance of focusing attention on the proper question to ask is even more 
clearly illustrated by Justice White’s dissent in Chadha. 462 U.S. at 970 (White, J., dissenting). 
Justice White took a functional approach to the separation of powers and argued that the 
legislative veto was “an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the 
President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, assures the 
accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress’ control over 
lawmaking.” Id. at 972–73. Significantly, Justice White justified this conclusion by arguing that 
the legislative veto did not prevent the executive or judicial branches from carrying out their 
constitutionally assigned duties. Id. at 974. The problem with this argument is that it simply 
misses the point. The issue in Chadha is not whether the legislative veto provision improperly 
restricts the constitutional authority of the executive or judicial branches. Instead, the question 
is whether the legislative veto allows Congress to act in an unchecked manner that might be 
subject to abuses and arbitrary behavior. Justice White is easily able to argue that there is no 
constitutional problem simply by asking the wrong constitutional question and failing to identify 
the precise nature of the potential constitutional concern before beginning the analysis of the 
constitutional validity of a congressional statute. 
 78.  See generally 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 79.  Id. at 734. 
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Thus, by describing the Comptroller General’s actions as “executive” 
the Court concluded that the statute created an unwarranted 
aggrandizement of Congress’s authority.80 
The Court has acted in a similarly formalist manner to bar 
Congress from expanding its own powers through statutes granting 
congressional officers the power to appoint members of the Federal 
Election Commission,81 and even a statute authorizing congressional 
representation on a board with authority over the Washington, D.C., 
airports.82 
In addition, the Court has been equally vigilant with respect to the 
expansion of judicial power. The Court has consistently resisted any 
effort to enlarge the authority of the courts beyond traditional cases 
or controversies, and it has prevented Congress from adding to the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.83 
Distinguishing between aggrandizement cases and statutory 
restriction cases does not, however, resolve all of the inconsistency of 
the Supreme Court’s case law. The Court has been far more willing to 
allow statutory expansion of the authority of the executive branch 
than it has with either the legislative or judicial branches. After some 
few initial efforts to limit the delegation of legislative authority to the 
executive branch,84 the Court has essentially abandoned any serious 
effort to limit the delegation of legislative authority as an 
 
 80.  Id. at 715. Justice White’s dissent in Chadha again missed the point by asking the 
wrong constitutional question. Instead of treating the statute as a possible aggrandizement of 
Congress, Justice White again insisted that the “court must ‘focu[s] on the extent to which [such 
a limitation] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.’” 478 U.S. at 762 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 
U.S. 525 (1977)). This approach once again creates a straw man by analyzing the statute as a 
restriction on the constitutional power of the Executive Branch instead of as an aggrandizement 
of the legislative branch. As a result, it was easy for Justice White to conclude that the statute 
“[did] not deprive the President of any power that he would otherwise have or that is essential 
to the performance of the duties of his office.” Id. at 763. By asking the wrong question, Justice 
White never truly grappled with the most significant issues raised by the statute. 
 81.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 (1976). 
 82.  See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 
U.S. 252, 255 (1991). 
 83.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, 
Predictability and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1009 n.89 
(1988). 
 84.  See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) 
(holding the code-making authority delegated in the National Industrial Recovery Act to be 
unconstitutional); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is 
not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it 
is thus vested.”). 
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unwarranted aggrandizement of executive power.85 As a result, when 
the Court must assess the constitutionality of a congressional 
delegation of authority to the President, the Court has been able to 
say only that a statute may not grant to the President a power that is 
expressly reserved to another branch.86 This approach has proven 
tricky when the powers at issue are as amorphous and hard to define 
as the “legislative power,” as in the non-delegation doctrine or the 
“judicial power,” which is at issue in cases involving Article I courts.87 
As Justice Scalia has explained: 
The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that 
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore 
assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather 
that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres 
in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the 
relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to 
determine—up to a point—how small or how large that degree 
shall be.88 
In spite of numerous scholarly efforts to resuscitate the non-
delegation doctrine,89 the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to 
revive the non-delegation doctrine as a limitation on Congress’s 
power to delegate so-called legislative power to the executive 
branch.90 Consequently, some scholars have questioned whether there 
is such a thing as a constitutional non-delegation doctrine,91 while 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (“The Constitution has never 
been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and 
practicality . . . to perform its function.”) (citation omitted); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 412 (1989) (“[I]n creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hybrid in structure and 
authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally 
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches.”). 
 86.  For example, Congress could not give the President the power to unilaterally appoint 
principal officers of the United States without Senate Confirmation. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988). 
 87.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).  
 88.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89.  See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make 
the Laws, 26 Har. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 245 (2003); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); 
Symposium, Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 295−442 
(1987); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1982). 
 90.  See Whitman vs. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (reversing a 
Court of Appeals decision that invalidated §109 (b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, which requires the 
Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards that, allowing “an adequate 
margin of safety” are “requisite to protect the public health”). 
 91.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Non Delegation Doctrine, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“In our view there just is no constitutional nondelegation 
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others have suggested that even if there is such a doctrine, we cannot 
expect the courts will enforce it.92 Therefore, the Supreme Court has 
been unable to impose meaningful restrictions on the statutory 
expansion of the President’s powers on the grounds that such 
authority is legislative rather than executive, and recent case law 
seems to confirm that one cannot expect the Court to change its mind 
in the future.93 
Similarly, the Court has allowed the delegation of quasi-judicial 
power to administrative agencies to resolve what might be considered 
cases or controversies.94 Although the limits on Congress’s power to 
delegate such quasi-judicial authority have been hotly debated and 
remain uncertain,95 it remains clear that Congress has substantial 
power to delegate such quasi-judicial authority to the executive 
branch. Although the Court made an initial stab at establishing 
formalistic rules on the creation of Article I courts,96 the Court clearly 
has abandoned that approach for a more functionalist balancing 
methodology.97 Any effort to prevent Congress from delegating 
significant quasi-judicial authority to the executive branch seems 
 
rule, nor has there ever been.”). 
 92.  See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 354 (2002) 
(“A plethora of scholars agree that, even if the Constitution contains some abstract 
nondelegation principle, it is too indefinite and uncertain to form the basis for constitutional 
doctrine.”); see also PETER SHANE & HAROLD BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 129 (2d ed. 2005). 
 93.  See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 489 (“It seems clear that an executive agency’s exercise of 
rulemaking authority pursuant to a valid delegation from Congress is ‘legislative.’”). 
 94.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986) 
(“Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court or resort to arbitration 
without impermissible incursions on the separation of powers, Congress may make available a 
quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve 
their differences.”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 85 (1932) (finding that the Deputy 
Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission had the duty to 
determine the quasi jurisdictional fact of whether there existed an employer employee 
relationship). 
 95.  See, Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 237 n.9 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, “Success” and 
the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 280–81 (1990); Larry Kramer, The Constitution as 
Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND, L.J. 283, 288–89 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, 
Legislative Power and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291, 292 (1990); David A. Strauss, Article III 
Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 308 (1990). 
 96.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73–76 (1982) 
(“[T]o accept appellants’ reasoning, would require that we replace the principles delineated in 
our precedents, rooted in history and the Constitution, with a rule of broad legislative discretion 
that could effectively eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch 
of the Federal Government.”). 
 97.  See Schor, 478 U.S. at 857 (finding the assignment of quasi-judicial functions to CFTC 
to be constitutional). 
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doomed to failure. It is simply too difficult to determine the point at 
which executive action becomes an exercise of “the judicial power” to 
expect the Court to be able to enforce that border effectively. The 
functional balancing test adopted by the Court in Schor98 is 
sufficiently loose that it allows Congress to delegate quasi-judicial 
authority to the executive branch with few substantive limitations. 
Unfortunately, the Court seems not to have even appreciated how 
the assignment of quasi-judicial and executive powers to one 
executive agency could create aggrandizement issues similar to the 
ones at issue in the cases involving Congress and the courts. For 
example, the Court has utterly failed to distinguish between Article I 
courts that exercise no executive authority on the one hand, and 
executive branch agencies that clearly perform executive law 
enforcement functions as well as the adjudicatory functions of an 
Article I court, on the other. Indeed, the Court chose its review of a 
statute granting quasi-judicial authority to such an executive branch 
agency (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) as the occasion 
to take a more deferential approach to Congressional delegation of 
authority than it had previously with respect to the bankruptcy courts, 
which are entirely separate from the executive law enforcement 
process.99 This failure ignores the potential for abusive uses of power 
when the quasi-adjudicative functions delegated to an Article I court 
are merged with the executive enforcement functions of a regulatory 
agency. Madison in the Federalist No. 47 quoted Montesquieu in 
saying that: 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body . . . there can be no liberty because apprehensions 
may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical 
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner . . . . Were the power 
of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
 
 98.  See id. at 851 (stating that factors weighed include: 1) “the extent to which the 
‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts,” 2) “the extent to which 
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in 
Article III courts” 3) “the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated,” and 4) “the 
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III”). 
 99.  Compare Schor, 478 U.S. at 857 (finding the “limited jurisdiction that the CFTC asserts 
over state law claims as a necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims willingly 
submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication does not contravene separation of 
powers principles or Article III”), with N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (“We conclude that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1471 . . . of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the 
essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those 
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an 
exercise of Congress’ power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.”). 
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subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul, for the judge would 
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the 
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.100 
Regulatory agencies to which Congress has assigned both adjudicative 
and law enforcement functions are the very definition of such a 
combination of authority. 
Not only did the Court fail to recognize this in Schor, it looked 
right at the aggrandizement issue and missed it when it noted: 
Nor does our decision in Bowsher v. Synar . . . require a contrary 
result. Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the 
aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a 
coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question 
presented in this litigation is whether Congress impermissibly 
undermined, without appreciable expansion of its own power, the 
role of the Judicial Branch.101 
The Court entirely ignored the possibility that the grant of such 
adjudicative authority to an executive agency would impermissibly 
aggrandize the executive branch. 
The vexing question, therefore, is how the Court could reconcile 
its cases dealing with the statutory assignment of a quasi-judicial 
power to the executive branch with its more restrictive precedents 
limiting the statutory augmentation of the judicial and legislative 
branches. In this respect, it might help the Court to recall its own 
admonition in the Chadha case: 
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new 
federal government into three defined categories, legislative, 
executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each 
Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the 
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to 
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.102 
One way to heed this admonition in the case of delegation of 
quasi-judicial authority to the executive branch is to require the 
separation of the quasi-judicial authority from the power to initiate 
enforcement actions and supervise the operations of the General 
Counsel who is responsible for the conduct of enforcement litigation. 
 
 100.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 326 (James Madison) (James Cooke, 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
 101.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 856–57. 
 102.  I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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Currently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission not only 
decides cases as an adjudicatory body but also is responsible for the 
initiation and conduct of enforcement litigation. A similar pattern 
prevails at the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Securities Exchange Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, and numerous other executive branch 
agencies. 
This is not, however, the only model for the delegation of 
adjudicative authority to the executive branch. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Act is enforced by lawyers in the Department of 
Labor, but enforcement cases are adjudicated before the independent 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Similarly, the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act is enforced by Department of 
Labor lawyers within the Mine Safety and Health Administration, but 
cases are adjudicated before the independent Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission. There is no reason why Congress 
could not insist upon this separation of powers within the executive 
branch as a means to avoid an unnecessary accumulation of power 
within one administrative agency. 
This is an area where the unbalanced separation of powers 
Supreme Court precedent could be tipped back more towards 
equilibrium by Congress. For Congress to do this, however, it must 
take seriously the need to identify the delegation of adjudicative 
authority to the executive branch as a potential aggrandizement of 
executive power and not just a limitation on the power of the federal 
courts. 
The only significant exception to the Court’s general deference to 
congressional expansion of executive branch power is the Court’s line 
item veto case, Clinton v. City of New York, where the Court took a 
clearly formalistic approach, invalidating a statute that granted the 
President the power to cancel certain items of new spending authority 
or limited tax benefits within five days of signing a bill into law.103 
Clinton is, however, a rare exception in the Court’s separation of 
powers jurisprudence where the Court has enforced a procedural 
check on the method by which the executive branch exercises its 
power. 
 
 103.  524 U.S. 417, 447–49 (1998) (“If there is to be a new procedure in which the President 
will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a law,’ such change 
must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of 
the Constitution.”). 
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For the most part, the Court has looked the other way as Congress 
continually expands the powers of the executive branch. Because of 
this imbalance, many scholars have argued that Congress should be 
free to enlarge its own powers as a counterbalance to the increasing 
authority of the executive branch.104 As developed further below, such 
a response would be a mistake because it would remove a vital 
procedural check that the framers intended to place on Congress. 
Instead, as discussed in Part III, Congress has the authority to correct 
the imbalance by imposing analogous procedural checks on the power 
of the executive branch. 
II. PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE COURTS AND CONGRESS 
The constitutional checks imposed on the judicial and legislative 
branches flow from the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution limits 
the procedural form in which the federal courts and Congress may 
exercise their power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
federal courts may exercise substantive power only in the context of a 
case or controversy. In the case of the legislative branch, the Court has 
restricted the exercise of substantive power to the bicameral passage 
of legislation and presentment to the President for signature or veto. 
These conclusions flow not from a general theory of formalism or 
functionalism, but from the specific expectations the framers had for 
how the two branches would exercise their substantive powers under 
the Constitution. 
A. Procedural Checks on the Federal Courts 
The framers restricted the Court’s exercise of substantive 
authority to the context of an adjudicated case or controversy. The 
constitutional history of Article III explains the importance of this 
case or controversy requirement as a protection against the abuse of 
judicial power. As explained below, the framers depended upon the 
case or controversy requirement to quell concerns about the 
unchecked power of federal judges. 
Although the Constitution expressly grants federal judges tenure 
during good behavior,105 many believed that such unchecked power 
 
 104.  See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 7; Strauss, supra note 7. 
 105.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall 
hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”). 
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would lead to abuses of judicial authority.106 A number of critics 
argued that the absence of political checks over the federal judiciary 
would lead to abuses of authority. For example, the famous anti-
federalist pseudonym “Brutus,” criticized the new constitution by 
arguing that: 
They have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the 
word. There is no power above them to controul [sic] any of their 
decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they 
cannot be controuled [sic] by the laws of the legislature. In short, 
they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every 
power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally 
soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.107 
The critics of Article III complained both that federal judges would 
have too much power and that impeachment was an insufficient 
method of controlling that authority. For example, another critic of 
ratification, the Federal Farmer, wrote: 
It is an observation of an approved writer, that judicial power is of 
such a nature, that when we have ascertained and fixed its limits, 
with all the caution and precision we can, it will yet be formidable, 
somewhat arbitrary and despotic—that is, after all our cares, we 
must leave a vast deal to the discretion and interpretation—to the 
wisdom, integrity, and politics of the judges—These men, such is 
the state even of the best laws, may do wrong, perhaps, in a 
thousand cases, sometimes with, and sometimes without design, yet 
it may be impracticable to convict them of misconduct.108 
Moreover, the opponents of judicial independence argued that the 
framers’ concerns about the potential power of the legislature led 
them to underestimate the potential for judicial misconduct and abuse 
of power. As one opponent noted: 
[W]e are more in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary 
government in this department [the Judiciary] than in any other. In 
the unsettled state of things in this country, for several years past, it 
is been thought, that our particular legislatures have, sometimes, 
 
 106.  See Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS 
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 284−85 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (noting that 10 states 
maintained some form of political control over sitting judges and only three states imposed an 
unqualified good behavior standard). The protections in Article III contrast sharply with the 
state constitutions, none of which provided protection against reduction in salary and many of 
which allowed for some provision for removal of judges by the political branches in addition to 
impeachment. Id. 
 107.  THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438, 473 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 108.  Id. at 315. 
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departed from the line of strict justice, while the law courts have 
shewn a disposition more punctually to keep to it. We are not 
sufficiently attentive to the circumstances, that the measures of 
popular legislatures naturally settle down in time, and gradually 
approach a mild and just medium; while the rigid systems of the 
law courts naturally become more severe and arbitrary, if not 
carefully tempered and guarded by the constitution, and by laws, 
from time to time.109 
Some critics became even more dramatic in expressing their fear of 
unchecked judicial power: 
To conclude—as the Fox in the Fable, wanting to rob a hen-roost, 
or do some such like prank, humbly besought admittance and 
house room only for his head,—his whole body presently followed 
—. So courts more crafty as well as more craving than that 
designing animal, have scarce ever gained an inch of power, but 
they have stretched it to an ell; and when they have got in but a 
finger their whole train has soon followed.110 
The Federalist supporters of the Constitution argued that the 
procedures imposed on the exercise of judicial power would prevent 
abuse. In particular, they relied on three procedural elements of 
judicial decision-making to prevent judicial abuse of power: (1) the 
case or controversy requirement; (2) the intra-branch check of 
appellate review and (3) the right to a jury trial. 
1. The Case or Controversy Requirement 
The defenders of Article III relied on the case or controversy 
requirement because they interpreted it to mean precedent would 
control the exercise of discretion by federal judges. Alexander 
Hamilton most vigorously expressed this defense of the 
Constitutional independence of the courts. Hamilton expressly relied 
on the power of precedent as a check on judicial power: “To avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should 
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define 
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them . . . .”111 Thus, in Hamilton’s famous words, the courts were not 
free to exercise their “WILL instead of JUDGMENT,” which would 
result in the “substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative 
 
 109.  Id. at 316. 
 110.  Id. at 210. 
 111.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed., 1961). 
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body.”112 Chief Justice Marshall later echoed that sentiment, while he 
was presiding in the trial of Aaron Burr, and asserted that even the 
exercise of judicial discretion must not be dictated by the Court’s 
“inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by 
sound legal principles.”113 
The language of Article III does not unequivocally say that federal 
courts may exercise substantive federal judicial power only in the 
context of a litigated case and not by prospective rulemaking. Article 
III, § 2 simply uses the words “cases” (as in “cases arising under the 
laws of the United States”) and “controversies” (as in “controversies 
involving citizens of different states”) as the method of describing the 
kinds of disputes over which the courts would have jurisdiction. The 
language alone does not necessarily imply that substantive 
rulemaking was prohibited. Yet that is clearly how the framers 
described the powers of the courts and defended Article III against its 
antifederalist opponents. Moreover, the framers avoided any grant of 
authority to federal judges that might be exercised outside the context 
of a case or controversy. Thus, for example, the constitutional 
convention rejected a proposal to give judges a role on a council of 
revision that would have the power to veto legislation.114 
Later justices picked up on the same theme and emphasized that 
the judge’s power was limited by the context in which it was exercised. 
Justice Cardozo noted “[t]he judge, even when he is free, is still not 
wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of 
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.”115 
Justice Frankfurter later put this same principle more succinctly: “We 
do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to 
considerations of individual expediency.”116 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciaries [sic] 
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional 
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
controversies.”117 
 
 112.  Id. at 526. 
 113.  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (Va. Cir. 1807). 
 114.  See MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789 75, 79 
(1937); James T. Barry, III, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 235, 253−54 (1989). 
 115.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). 
 116.  Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 117.  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). 
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Almost immediately after the ratification of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court recognized the procedural limitations on the exercise 
of judicial power. In Hayburn’s Case, the members of the Court, 
sitting as various circuit judges, declined to exercise authority to 
review wartime pension claims because they were not “properly 
judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner.”118 Under Chief 
Justice John Jay the Supreme Court refused to give President 
Washington informal advice on legal issues relating to the neutral 
status of the United States in the European War of 1793.119 In Muskrat 
v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that federal judicial 
power may only be exercised in the context of a case or controversy, 
which the Court defined to be “the claims of litigants brought before 
the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are 
established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of 
rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.”120 
Congress may, of course, grant to the courts the power to make 
prospective rules in a non-case or controversy context, as long as 
those rules are purely procedural. For example, under the Rules 
Enabling Act,121 the Supreme Court and all courts established by acts 
of Congress “may from time to time prescribe rules for their conduct 
of their business,”122 and the Supreme Court “shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of 
evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of 
appeals.”123 These rules, however, may not “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”124 Although the line between substance and 
procedure is famously blurry in the context of judicial power,125 it is 
clear that Congress could not constitutionally grant to the courts the 
power to create clearly substantive rules in prospective form and that 
the courts may create such rules only through the procedural 
mechanism of a case or a controversy. 
 
 118.  2 U.S. 409, 410 n.* (1792). 
 119.  Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President George 
Washington (Aug. 8, 1793). 
 120.  219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911). 
 121.  Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012). 
 122.  § 2071(a). 
 123.  § 2072(a). 
 124.  § 2072(b). 
 125.  See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 468 (1996) (referring to the 
“uncertain area between substance and procedure”). 
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2. The Intra-branch Check of Appellate Review 
One of the additional benefits of limiting the exercise of judicial 
power to the context of cases or controversies is that it allows for 
multiple levels of review of a particular case. The trial courts find the 
facts and issue initial decisions while the courts of appeals have the 
power to review the decisions of the trial courts and the Supreme 
Court retains the ultimate power to correct areas of law. Although the 
Constitution does not guarantee the right to an appeal,126 it clearly 
contemplates an appellate process. Ever since the Judiciary Act of 
1789, federal statutes have provided for at least one level of appellate 
review.127 Thus, the case or controversy limitation permits the creation 
of intra-branch checks on the exercise of judicial power that stand in 
the place of inter-branch checks from which the judiciary is largely 
protected. In addition, although, in the famous words of Justice 
Jackson, the Supreme Court may “be infallible only because we are 
final,”128 even the Supreme Court is subject to the limitations of a 
multi-tiered judicial system. In Marbury v. Madison,129 the Court 
tacitly acknowledged the significance of this multi-tiered system by 
declaring that Congress could not statutorily grant original mandamus 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, which effectively interpreted the 
grants of original jurisdiction in Article III to be a ceiling rather than 
a floor for Supreme Court jurisdiction. Hence, the Supreme Court is 
largely limited to reviewing cases in which the factual record is made 
in lower courts, which limits the scope of the Court’s power. 
3. The Right to a Jury Trial 
Finally, the framers expected that the right to a jury trial would 
prevent abuses of judicial power. Hamilton sought to reassure 
opponents of the Constitution that the grant of appellate jurisdiction 
 
 126.  The Supreme Court has described the right of appeal as “not essential to due process, 
provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance.” Ohio ex. 
rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. For Summit Cty., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930); see also 
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (ruling that appellate review of criminal 
convictions is not a requirement of due process of law). 
 127.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (stating that Supreme Court 
review of “final judgements and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court, 
brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or 
removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or 
value of two thousand dollars”). 
 128.  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 129.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (“Congress have not power to 
give original jurisdiction to the supreme court in other cases than those described in the 
constitution.”). 
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to the Supreme Court, both as to matters of fact and law, would not be 
used to overturn the findings of common law juries.130 Hamilton 
argued that appellate jurisdiction over factual issues would extend 
only to civil law matters and other cases not tried to a jury. Hamilton 
stated that this interpretation 
puts it out of all doubt that the supposed abolition of the trial by 
jury, by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The 
legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to 
provide that in appeals to the supreme court there should be no 
reexamination of facts where they had been tried in the original 
causes by juries.131 
In any event, the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed the right to a jury 
trial, ultimately addressed the Anti-Federalists’ concerns. In suits at 
common law where the amount in controversy exceeded $20, the 
Seventh Amendment required that “the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any court of the United States than according to rules of the 
common law.”132 Thus, the framers guaranteed that the jury would 
continue to serve as a significant public check on the fact-finding 
power of Article III judges. 
Furthermore, the new Congress moved quickly to protect the 
jurisdiction of common law juries against the intrusions of equity 
courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly limited equity jurisdiction 
in a number of areas to preserve the common law right to a jury 
trial.133 In addition, sections 19, 26 and 30 of the Act specifically 
circumscribed judicial fact-finding.134 By 1800, the Anti-Federalists’ 
three principal concerns about preserving the right to jury trials were 
addressed: (1) the Constitution guaranteed the basic right to a jury 
trial; (2) the Constitution also restricted the courts’ ability to review a 
jury’s findings of fact; and (3) statutes expressly restrained the courts’ 
ability to avoid jury trials by expanding equity jurisdiction. For our 
purposes, the key point is that the jury trial could only check judicial 
power that was exercised through the procedure of a litigated case or 
 
 130.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 549−51 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 131.  Id. at 552. 
 132.  U.S. CONST. amend VII. 
 133.  Section 16 of the Act restated the general common law rule that suits in equity would 
not be permitted in any case in which a “plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at 
law.” Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of The Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (discussing Hamilton’s view of the Judiciary Act). 
 134.  Id. 
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controversy and not through the procedure of substantive prospective 
rule making. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to 
protect against the abuse of judicial power by limiting its exercise to 
the context of a justiciable case or controversy. In that context, 
precedent, the internal checks of the multi-level court system, and the 
right to a jury trial ensure that the courts will not abuse their 
authority. 
B. Procedural Checks on the Exercise of Legislative Power 
Supreme Court cases that limit Congress’s authority to grant itself 
additional statutory powers rely on a similar procedural limitation. 
Although the Court has not expressly discussed these restrictions as a 
control on the form in which Congress exercises its power, the cases 
certainly accommodate such an understanding. When viewed 
together, these cases are best read as identifying the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of Article I, § 7 as the legislative analog to 
the case or controversy requirement. If Congress wishes to act 
substantively to affect the rights and responsibilities of individuals 
outside the legislative branch, it may do so only through the bicameral 
passage of a bill and presentment to the President for signature or 
veto. 
In Chadha, while reviewing the constitutionality of a one-house 
legislative veto, the Court stated that they must first “establish that 
the challenged action . . . is of the kind to which the procedural 
requirements of Art. I, § 7 apply. Not every action taken by either 
House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements 
of Art. I . . . . Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and 
fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but 
upon whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as 
legislative in its character and effect.” 135 The Court then proceeded to 
define legislative authority as “action that had the purpose and effect 
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside 
the legislative branch.”136 
As previously noted, many scholars have justly criticized the 
Court’s characterization of “legislative” action.137 If the veto of Mr. 
 
 135.  I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 7, at 511 (“In paying literal, even slavish, obeisance to the 
Framers’ intentions on the specifics of governmental organization and structure, the courts 
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Chadha’s deportation suspension was a legislative act then why was 
the Attorney General’s suspension of the deportation not also a 
legislative act that would have required bicameral passage and 
presentment to the President as well? As Professor Lawrence Tribe 
has argued, the difficulty with the Court’s definition of legislation  
is that the same observations apply with equal validity to nearly all 
exercises of delegated authority, whether by a House of Congress 
or by an executive department or an administrative agency. Both 
through rule-making and through case-by-case adjudication, 
exercises of delegated authority change legal rights and privileges 
no less than do full-fledged laws.138 
The Court might have made a more coherent statement of 
constitutional doctrine by using the same language not as a definition 
for the terms legislation or legislative act, but rather as the definition 
for when Congress acts substantively as opposed to procedurally. 
Thus, when Congress acts to alter the “legal rights, duties and 
relations of persons outside the legislative branch,” it is exercising 
substantive authority under the Constitution. The Court then might 
have drawn the conclusion that whenever Congress acts substantively, 
it must do so through bicameral passage and presentment to the 
President. 
Such a characterization would place the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause on the same footing as the case or controversy 
limitation on the exercise of judicial power. Seen in this way, the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clause acts as a procedural check on 
Congress by ensuring that whenever it acts substantively, it acts with 
the procedural checks and balances that the framers regarded as an 
essential protection against legislative abuse of power. Thus, it is not 
necessary to define a legislative act; it is sufficient to say that, just as 
the courts may exercise their power only in the context of a case or 
controversy,  Congress  may   exercise   its  substantive  authority  only  
 
 
violate the deeper, more fundamental spirit of the Framers’ vision that power should be divided 
and balanced creatively to prevent misuse.”); Strauss, supra note 7, at 522 (“[T]he repetitive 
making of ‘reasonable’ choices by Congress will, over time, erode the independence of the 
judiciary or of the President. The argument is that a series of small steps, each reasonable within 
its context, provides a means by which Congress may subordinate either or both of these actors. 
The changes litigation growth has been working in the judiciary’s capacity to function, and the 
resulting spate of proposals to consign new areas to administrative rather than judicial 
provenance.”). 
 138.  1 TRIBE, supra note 62, at 144. 
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through the passage of a bill by both the House and Senate and 
presentment to the President.139 
The same analysis can be applied to the Court’s decision in 
Bowsher v. Synar. In Bowsher, the Court concluded “Congress cannot 
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the 
execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the 
execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to 
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over 
the execution of the laws.”140 Because the duties assigned to the 
Comptroller General by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act involved 
functions “plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional 
terms” the Court declared the grant of authority to be 
unconstitutional.141 Thus, the Court’s decision rests upon the 
assumption that “executive” actions can be clearly defined and 
distinguished from legislative actions. 
The Court did not have to define “execution” of the laws. Instead, 
the Court could have viewed Chadha as establishing the principle that 
neither Congress nor one of its agents can affect the substantive rights 
of anyone outside the legislative branch unless Congress utilizes the 
process of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. The 
exercise of any such authority by an officer of Congress, like the 
Comptroller General, is clearly unconstitutional on the basis of that 
principle. The problem is not that the action taken by the 
congressional officer is executive, it is rather that Congress is acting to 
affect substantive rights without following the procedure the 
Constitution requires. Such a rule may be easily applied any time 
Congress delegates substantive authority to one of its own. 
The Court itself has virtually admitted the futility of attempting to 
define congressionally controlled actions as either legislative actions 
or execution of the laws. In Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, the Court 
 
 139.  Fortunately, it should prove much easier to distinguish substantive from procedural 
actions in the context of congressional power than it is in the judicial realm. Private individuals 
participate in the actions of litigated cases in the judicial branch, so an action regulating those 
cases could be seen as affecting the legal rights of persons outside the judicial branch. 
Individuals do not have the same involvement in the legislative arena, so it is much easier to 
determine when a legislative action alters the “legal rights, duties and relations of persons 
outside the legislative branch.” 
 140.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
 141.  Id. at 732–33. 
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addressed the constitutionality of a statute that transferred federal 
operating control over two airports near the District of Columbia to a 
newly created regional authority.142 The statute required the 
appointment of a nine-member Board of Review that would consist of 
members of Congress serving “in their individual capacities, as 
representatives of users of the airports.”143 The Court was not faked 
out by the structure and concluded that the Board of Review was “an 
agent of Congress.”144 
The Court then noted that, as an agent of Congress, the Board 
could not exercise executive authority nor could it exercise legislative 
authority without complying with the requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment.145 Although the Court of Appeals had found the 
Board’s authority to be executive in nature, the Court concluded, 
We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by the 
Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review’s power is 
constitutionally impermissible. If the power is executive, the 
Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If 
the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity 
with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7. 
In short, when Congress “[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and 
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,” it must take that 
action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution.146 
Thus, the Court effectively recognized the futility of trying to define 
the terms “legislative” and “executive” in order to determine whether 
Congress may grant itself authority to act substantively. In effect, the 
Court acknowledged that any substantive action by Congress must be 
taken through the procedural mechanism of bicameral passage and 
presentment to the President. 
As a matter of constitutional text, such a limitation on the exercise 
of congressional authority is no less clear and direct than the case or 
controversy limitations of Article III. It is true that Article I does not 
expressly state that Congress may act substantively only through 
bicameral passage and presentment to the President, but neither does 
Article III state that the courts may exercise substantive power only 
 
 142.  501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991). 
 143.  Id. at 259. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 290. 
 146.  Id. at 276. 
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in the context of a case or controversy. Although Section 8, which 
describes the powers of Congress, nowhere states that these powers 
may be exercised only through bicameral passage and presentment to 
the President, it has always been understood that the requirements of 
the preceding section apply to each of the powers set forth in § 8.147 
When the framers intended Congress to exercise power in a 
manner other than through bicameral passage and presentment to the 
President, they explicitly set forth such authority in the Constitution. 
Article I, § 2, clause 5 gives the House of Representatives the sole 
power to initiate impeachments.148 Article I, § 3, clause 6 gives the 
Senate the sole power to try impeachments after the House brings 
charges.149 Article II, § 2, clause 2 gives the Senate the power to 
approve or disapprove of presidential appointments.150 The same 
provision gives the Senate the power to ratify treaties negotiated by 
the President. 
Recharacterizing the holdings of Chadha, Bowsher, and MWAA as 
imposing a procedural check on the manner in which Congress 
exercises substantive authority is consistent with the framers intent to 
control the potential abuse of power in the branch most responsive to 
political passion. The framers clearly recognized the potential abuse 
of power that might arise from the highly political nature of the 
legislature.151 Madison argued 
In a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is 
carefully limited both in the extent and the duration of its power, 
and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which 
is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an 
intrepid confidence in its own strength, which is sufficiently 
numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet 
not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its 
passions, by means by which reason prescribes; it is against the 
enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to 
 
 147.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983). 
 148.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 149.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 150.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 151.  See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 435 (“[P]rivate groups, whether minorities or (more 
likely) majorities, might use governmental authority to oppress others . . . . The separation of 
powers and the system of checks and balances were intended to reduce that risk. A faction 
might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire power over all three. The 
distribution of national powers thus operated to protect minorities from the tyranny of powerful 
private groups.”). 
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indulge all their jealously and exhaust all their precautions.152 
Similarly, during the constitutional debates on the need for a 
bicameral legislature, James Wilson argued 
Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. Sometimes in an 
Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there no danger of a 
Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the 
Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty 
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within 
itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house 
there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good 
sense of those who compose it.153 
Alexander Hamilton opposed a unicameral legislature on the ground 
that if the Constitution provided for only one house, 
we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important 
prerogatives of sovereignty; and thus entail upon our posterity, one 
of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation 
ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny, 
which the adversaries of the new constitution either are, or affect 
to be solicitous to avert.154 
Madison summed up the need for a bicameral legislature by arguing 
that  
In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, 
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the 
legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different 
modes of election and, different principles of action, as little 
connected with each other, as the nature of their common 
functions, and their common dependence on the society, will 
admit.155 
The framers expressed a similar concern about the need for a 
presidential veto as an essential check on legislative authority. 
Hamilton defended the President’s veto by arguing 
It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated 
to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, 
or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may 
happen to influence a majority of that body. . . The primary 
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the 
 
 152.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333−34 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 153.  FARRAND, supra note 114, at 254. 
 154.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 155.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
2017] PROCEDURAL CHECKS 243 
executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is 
to increase the chances in favor of the community, against the 
passing of bad laws, through haste, in-advertence, or design.156 
These checks on legislative authority would be subverted if 
Congress could affect the rights of those outside the legislative branch 
by delegating to itself the statutory authority to act without bicameral 
passage and presentment to the President. Just as the courts’ potential 
abuse of power is controlled by channeling the exercise of their 
authority through the procedural mechanism of a case or controversy, 
the Constitution guards against legislative abuse of power by 
requiring that any exercise of Congress’s authority be channeled 
through the procedural mechanism of bicameral passage and 
presentment to the President. 
Such a limitation does not prevent Congress from conducting its 
own internal operations through another procedural mechanism 
whether by action of one house alone, the action of a committee, or 
the action of an officer of Congress created by statute for the purpose 
of internal management of Congress’s operations. Just as the courts 
are free to enact rules of procedure through prospective rulemaking 
outside of the context of a case or controversy, Congress is permitted 
to regulate its own procedures without regard to the procedural 
checks imposed on its substantive authority. 
By reconceptualizing the Court’s definition of legislative action as 
simply a definition of the line between substantive and procedural 
authority, it becomes apparent that the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause is the legislative analog to the case or controversy 
requirement. Substantive action by both the judicial and legislative 
branches may be exercised only through the procedural mechanisms 
specified in the Constitution, while procedural regulations may 
proceed without the need for such strict limitations on the manner in 
which power is exercised. These constitutional requirements create 
procedural checks that limit the ability of the legislative and judicial 
branches to abuse the authority granted to them and protect the 
public from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power. 
C. Procedural Checks on the Executive Branch 
Although the Constitution imposes procedural checks on the 
exercise of substantive authority by the judicial and legislative 
 
 156.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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branches, there is no such comprehensive procedural check with 
respect to the executive branch. Unlike Article III, with its case or 
controversy requirement and Article I with its Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause, Article II contains nothing to suggest the form in 
which the executive branch must exercise all of its power. Article II, § 
1, clause 1 states that “the executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”157 Section 2 contains an 
enumeration of the specific powers granted to the President, but 
relatively few of these specific powers contain any procedural 
mechanism for their execution. The power to make treaties is 
contingent upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and the 
power to appoint principal officers of the United States is contingent 
upon the advice and consent of the Senate.158 Other than that, the 
President is generally limited only by the checks of statutes enacted 
by Congress, which may direct him to exercise delegated authority in 
a particular manner, because the President is generally required to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”159 
The Supreme Court, however, has identified some additional 
narrow and specific procedural checks that control the way certain 
types of executive powers are exercised. As detailed below, these 
checks include procedural safeguards required by the Due Process 
Clause, the limitations on how the President may use his veto power, 
and the requirement that quasi-judicial authority be subject to judicial 
review by an Article III court. Even with these checks, however, the 
executive branch is substantially less bound by procedural checks 
than the other two branches. 
1. Procedural Checks Imposed by the Due Process Clause 
When the executive branch takes actions that have the potential 
to deprive a person of a property right, including a vested interest in 
certain kinds of government benefits, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires that the executive must provide a hearing 
and other procedural safeguards before the property right is 
affected.160 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court reviewed a claim 
brought by a welfare recipient whose benefits were terminated 
without the benefit of a hearing before the benefits were 
 
 157.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 158.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 159.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 160.  See generally 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at §§ 9.3–9.5. 
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terminated.161 The Court determined that welfare benefits “are a 
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive 
them.”162 Thus, for the first time, the Court recognized government 
benefits as property that triggered the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause.163 These requirements included a pre-termination 
hearing that would include “minimum procedural safeguards, adapted 
to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the 
limited nature of the controversies to be resolved.”164 After Goldberg, 
the Court addressed many similar issues in which the executive 
branch was subject to the procedural requirements of the Due Process 
Clause.165 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Fifth 
Amendment imposes substantial procedural checks on executive 
power when the executive threatens to deprive individuals of vested 
property rights that include many different kinds of government 
entitlements. 
2. Procedural Checks on the President’s Veto Power 
Notwithstanding the absence of a comprehensive procedural 
check on the executive branch, the Constitution does contain certain 
procedural checks on the President’s power. In particular, the 
President may exercise his veto authority only with respect to an 
entire bill, passed by both the House and the Senate. Congress may 
not give the President power to veto only part of a bill in the form of 
a line-item veto. In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act,166 which authorized the President 
to cancel three types of provisions in newly enacted statutes: “(1) any 
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new 
direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”167 The Act imposed a 
number of strict limitations on how the President was to exercise his 
cancellation authority. First, in identifying items for cancellation, the 
President was required to consider the legislative history, the 
purposes, and other relevant information about the items to be 
 
 161.  397 U.S. 254 (1970).  
 162.  Id. at 262. 
 163.  See 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 571 (“[Goldberg] was the first case in which the Court 
applied the Due Process Clause broadly to government benefits that were previously classified 
as mere ‘privileges,’ . . . .”).  
 164.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267. 
 165.  See generally 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at §§ 9.3–9.5. 
 166.  2 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1996). 
 167.  § 691(a), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating 
on the ground that it violated the Presentment Clause of Art. I, §7, cl. 2 of the Constitution). 
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cancelled.168 Second, he was required to determine with respect to 
each cancellation that it would “(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; 
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm 
the national interest.”169 Finally, the statute required the President to 
transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each 
cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the 
enactment of the cancelled provision.170 The Act then permitted 
Congress to adopt a “disapproval bill” in order to nullify the 
President’s proposed cancellations. 
The Court concluded that “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the 
President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion 
of each . . . . There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes 
the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”171 The Court 
distinguished between the veto authority authorized by Article I, § 8, 
clause 2 and the cancellation authority granted by the Line Item Veto 
Act, “The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes 
law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The 
constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is 
of only a part.”172 The Court viewed these differences with the “single, 
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” of Article I, § 
7.173 The Court expressly distinguished line item veto authority from 
delegated discretionary authority to change tariff duties, a power 
upheld by the Court in Field v. Clark.174 The Court noted that the 
power to alter the tariff was “contingent upon a condition that did not 
exist when the Tariff Act was passed,” while the President’s line item 
veto authority “necessarily was based on the same conditions that 
Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes.”175 Second, the 
tariff statute at issue in Field required the President to make the 
alterations upon finding that certain conditions existed, while under 
the line item veto statute the determinations made by the President 
do not require him to cancel or not to cancel a provision.176 Finally, the 
President’s suspension of a tariff implemented congressional policy 
 
 168.  See § 691(b), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417. 
 169.  § 691(a)(3)(A), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417. 
 170.  § 691(a)(3)(B), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417. 
 171.  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438. 
 172.  Id. at 439. 
 173.  Id. at 439–40 (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). 
 174.  143 U.S. 649, 696−97 (1892). 
 175.  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 443. 
 176.  Id. (citing Field, 143 U.S. at 686–87).  
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while the cancellation under the Line Item Veto Act expressly 
rejected the policy judgment made by Congress.177 The Court also 
distinguished statutes involving discretionary spending authority on 
the ground that the Line Item Veto Act gave the President “unilateral 
power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.”178 
Clinton has attracted many comments both praising and criticizing 
the decision. The decision’s supporters argue that Clinton effectively 
implements the non-delegation doctrine in a way that the Supreme 
Court has never otherwise been prepared to do.179 Because the line 
item veto permits Congress to evade responsibility for difficult budget 
choices and leave that responsibility with the President, the Court’s 
decision correctly rejected that innovation and placed the 
responsibility back with Congress, where it belongs.180 Critics have 
agreed with Justices Scalia, Breyer, and O’Connor that the Line Item 
Veto Act did nothing more than delegate discretionary authority to 
the President. Since the Line Item Veto Act did not involve an 
attempt by Congress to increase its own authority it did not warrant 
the restrictive formalist approach of Chadha. Instead, it granted the 
President the power to control spending and thus gave the President 
additional power to regulate an appropriate executive function.181 
The analogy to Chadha is a useful one, but in support for the 
decision rather than as a critique. The same reasons that warranted 
the Court’s imposition of a procedural check on legislative authority 
in Chadha also support the imposition of an analogous procedural 
check on the President in Clinton. The purpose of the Bicameralism 
and Presentment Clause is to ensure that basic decisions on matters of 
 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 447. In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O’Connor and Breyer, argued 
that the “title of the Line Item Veto Act . . . has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court.” 
Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the executive action authorized by 
the statute was not a line item veto, but simply an exercise of discretionary spending authorized 
by statute and no different in effect from numerous other discretionary spending statutes 
adopted by Congress in the past. Id. 
 179.  See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item 
Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and its Implications for Clinton v. City of 
New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 366–67 (2001); Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: 
Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1629–31 (1997); Lawrence 
Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1659, 1660–65 (1997); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
385, 436 (1992). 
 180.  See Rappaport, id.; Stearns, id. 
 181.  See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget 
Process and The Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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significant federal policies such as spending and taxation are made by 
both houses and the President together so that all three remain 
accountable for these actions and no one has the power to take 
actions unchecked by the others. The procedural limitations thus 
impose a significant restriction on the power of either branch to abuse 
its authority and act arbitrarily. 
It is insufficient to argue in response that Congress could have 
granted discretionary authority to the President to spend all or part of 
an appropriation based on an assessment of conditions arising after 
the adoption of the statute. The President is allowed this delegated 
discretion in order to respond to changing circumstances in a way 
that, as head of the executive branch, he is much better able to 
perform than Congress is. In exercising that power, it is, of course, 
possible for the President to use “changed circumstances” as simply a 
pretext for a decision that is in fact based upon his disagreement, ab 
initio, with Congress’s decision to authorize any expenditure at all for 
a particular subject, but there is simply no way to determine whether 
that is what the President is doing. 
In the case of the Line Item Veto Act, however, it is quite simple 
to make that determination because the Act specified a limited time 
period of only five days after enactment of the statute for the 
President to cancel items of new spending or special tax provisions. In 
this instance, it is simply not possible for circumstances to have 
changed enough to warrant suspension of the expenditure or tax 
provision, and the only possible basis for the President’s decision is 
his disagreement with the judgment of the House and Senate that 
these provisions were important enough to enact into law. Thus, the 
Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to circumvent the 
constitutional procedures requiring concurrence of House, Senate, 
and President without the need to justify the departure based on 
changed circumstances. Such an action clearly contravenes the entire 
purpose of the Bicameralism and Presentment clause of the 
Constitution, and it allows the President to take sole responsibility for 
such spending and tax provisions. 
It is, perhaps, surprising that Justice Scalia would not be receptive 
to this argument since he made an analogous argument in opposing 
the delegation of legislative authority to the Sentencing Commission 
in his dissent in Mistretta v. United States.182 Justice Scalia argued 
 
 182.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
2017] PROCEDURAL CHECKS 249 
The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that 
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore 
assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather 
that a certain degree of discretion and thus of lawmaking, inheres 
in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the 
relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to 
determine—up to a point—how small or how large that decree 
shall be.183 
In the case of the Sentencing Commission, its delegated 
lawmaking function was completely divorced from any responsibility 
for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the 
law. It is divorced from responsibility for the execution of the law “not 
only because the Commission is not said to be ‘located in the 
Executive Branch’ . . . but, more importantly, because the Commission 
neither exercises any executive power on its own, nor is subject to the 
control of the President who does.”184 Thus, Justice Scalia was arguing 
that delegation is permissible because it is in large part 
indistinguishable from the exercise of the executive power; when 
divorced from its association with the executive power it becomes 
simply a naked authorization to legislate—thus, in effect, making the 
Sentencing Commission, in Scalia’s words, “a junior varsity 
Congress.”185 
A similar situation exists with respect to the Line Item Veto Act, 
since delegation of discretionary spending and taxing authority is 
authorized because it is necessary to allow the President to respond to 
changed circumstances in an efficient manner. When divorced from 
that justification by temporally limiting the President’s exercise of his 
delegated power to the same week that the bill became law, the entire 
justification for such delegations vanishes, and the delegated authority 
becomes the naked power to change the bargain struck by the House, 
Senate, and the President. This made the President even more than a 
junior varsity member, since his decisions under the Line Item Veto 
Act trumped the authority of the bicameral varsity Congress. 
As a result, the Court’s decision in Clinton seems entirely justified 
by both the letter and the spirit of the Bicameralism and the 
Presentment Clauses. It ensures that the President will not be able to 
alter the legislative bargain struck between himself and both Houses 
 
 183.  Id. at 417. 
 184.  Id. at 420. 
 185.  Id. at 427. 
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of Congress based solely on a substantive policy disagreement. This 
decision is also consistent with the other decisions of the Supreme 
Court imposing procedural checks on the exercise of power by the 
federal courts and the Congress. Like Chadha, the decision in Clinton 
v. New York cabins the authority of the President by imposing a 
procedural mechanism to channel and restrain executive power and 
prevent it from being exercised in an arbitrary and abusive manner. If 
the President wishes to take an action the only purpose of which 
could be to change the bargain struck between the House, the Senate, 
and the President, the President must do so through the procedural 
mechanisms specified by the Constitution: a veto of the entire bill and 
not cancellation of individual parts of that bill in a way that creates an 
entirely new bargain to which neither the House nor the Senate have 
consented. Thus, Clinton is an appropriate example of the Court 
adopting a procedural check to restrain the power of the President in 
a manner similar to the procedural checks that are imposed on the 
other branches. 
3. Procedural Checks on the Executive’s Quasi-Judicial Power 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has recently taken a 
permissive, functional approach to the assignment of quasi-judicial 
power to the executive branch. However, one aspect of the Supreme 
Court’s Article I court jurisprudence seems consistent with the cases 
imposing procedural checks on the legislative and judicial branches. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the validity of the assignment of 
quasi-judicial power to the executive branch depends on “the extent 
to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to 
Article III courts.”186 This requirement places an important 
procedural check on the exercise of quasi-judicial power by executive 
branch agencies. To the extent that any executive branch adjudication 
is subject to searching and thorough Article III judicial review, there 
remains an important check upon the exercise of adjudicative 
authority by the executive branch that protects against the potential 
abuse of authority. 
This procedural check not only protects the judicial branch and 
ensures that it may continue to carry out its essential constitutional 
functions, it also recognizes the significance of a procedural check like 
the ones imposed on the judicial and legislative branches. Judicial 
 
 186.  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
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review of the executive branch’s adjudicative actions is analogous to 
the requirement that the President must have the option to review 
legislation passed by both houses of Congress to determine whether 
he wishes to exercise a veto. These procedural checks ensure that the 
authority granted by the Constitution will not be abused, and 
Congress should not be permitted to remove these checks through 
legislative devices, regardless of the purported need. 
III. CONGRESS’S POWER TO IMPOSE PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
The procedural checks imposed by the Constitution on the 
executive branch are admittedly limited. They apply to only certain 
types of executive action, unlike the constitutionally required 
procedural checks on the legislative and judicial branches. It is, 
however, possible to find significant procedural checks on the 
executive branch that channel executive power in such a way as to 
prevent it from being abused or exercised in an arbitrary fashion. 
Congress has the power to channel executive branch authority 
through carefully wrought procedures, and it has done so with the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)187 and 
numerous other statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act,188 
the Government in the Sunshine Act,189 and the Privacy Act,190 that 
regulate how the executive branch exercises its substantive authority. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the express 
constitutional authority to establish procedural checks on the manner 
in which the executive branch carries out authority delegated to it by 
Congress.191 The Clause gives Congress the power to enact laws that 
“shall be necessary and proper” to “carry into Execution” the powers 
vested in the federal government.192 As John Manning has noted, the 
“[C]lause is the one and only provision of the Constitution that 
directly addresses the establishment of the federal government. It 
 
 187.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3344, 6362, 7562 
(2012). 
 188.  Administrative Procedure Act § 552. 
 189.  Administrative Procedure Act § 552b. 
 190.  Administrative Procedure Act § 552a. 
 191.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”). 
 192.  Id. 
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gives the relevant power expressly to Congress, but conditions its 
exercise upon satisfaction of the requirement that any resulting law be 
“necessary and proper” for carrying into execution the powers 
granted by the Constitution.”193 Although formalists and 
functionalists disagree on the extent to which the clause empowers 
Congress to change the structure of the federal government,194 at the 
very least, the clause gives Congress the power to mandate the 
procedural safeguards that apply when the executive branch 
implements a congressional statute. 
Congress has stepped in to fill the void left by the absence of 
procedural checks in Article II and has provided statutory guarantees 
against the abuse of power by the executive branch. Congress has the 
authority to impose the same kinds of procedural checks on the 
exercise of power by the executive branch that the Court has applied 
to the exercise of power by the courts and Congress, and Congress has 
used that authority to adopt the APA and other statutes that channel 
the exercise of executive power through specified procedural 
mechanisms.195 For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to focus 
on the APA, which becomes the analog for the procedural checks 
imposed on the judicial branch by the case or controversy 
requirement and on the legislative branch by the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses. 
When Congress adopted the APA, it imposed a set of procedural 
requirements on both the administrative rulemaking process and the 
administrative adjudication process.196 Section 553 requires that, with 
specified exceptions, any binding rules issued by the executive branch 
must be promulgated with “public notice of the proposed rule, receipt 
and consideration of comments on the proposed rule on issuance of 
the final rule incorporating the statement of basis and purpose.”197 
The APA expressly authorizes courts to set aside agency rulemaking 
actions if they are “arbitrary, capricious, in abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”198 Although agencies are 
generally free to choose between adjudication and rulemaking as the 
 
 193.  Manning, supra note 17, at 1951. 
 194.  Id. at 1987–93. 
 195.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3344, 6362, 7562. 
 196.  See §§ 553, 554. 
 197.  1 PIERCE, supra note 15. 
 198.  § 706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 
(1971). 
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method of administrative policy making,199 most scholars support the 
general practice of agencies in making policy through the rulemaking 
process. Professor Richard Pierce notes that commentators have 
identified at least nine different advantages of rulemaking over 
adjudication as a source of generally applicable rules.200 Despite these 
arguments, however, the Court has not yet shown any sign of 
requiring agencies to utilize prospective rulemaking. 
The APA imposes a number of different notice requirements on 
agency rulemaking. First, the agency must provide notice of what it 
proposes to do and the basis for its proposed actions.201 These 
requirements are designed to provide any interested members of the 
public with an opportunity to comment on the agency’s proposal. The 
senate report on the APA stated that this “agency notice must be 
sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so 
that they may present responsive data or argument relating 
thereto.”202 In addition to this preliminary notice, an agency must 
publish “a substantive rule . . . not less than 30 days before its 
effective date, except—(1) a substantive rule which grants or 
recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction; (2) interpretive rules 
and statements of policy; or (3) as otherwise provided by the agency 
for good cause found and published with the rule.”203 This 
requirement allows members of the public sufficient time to prepare 
for the implementation of the rule and insure that they will be in 
compliance with the rule’s requirements.204 This thirty-day period is a 
statutory minimum, and courts may require an agency to extend the 
time to a substantially longer period.205 
Finally, agencies must make all rules publicly available in order for 
them to have a binding effect. The APA expressly requires each 
agency to “publish in the Federal Register . . . rules of 
procedure . . . substantive rules of general applicability . . . statements 
of general policy or interpretations of general applicability . . . and . . . 
 
 199.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily 
in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 200.  1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 368. 
 201.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 202.  S. REP. NO. 79-248, at 200 (1946). 
 203.  § 553(d). 
 204.  1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 424. 
 205.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n. Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 
254−55 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that “the effective date of the new rule” is unreasonable because 
it can cause “unnecessary expense”).  
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each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.”206 The precise 
scope of all of these notice requirements is unclear and has given rise 
to much litigation,207 but, regardless of the exact scope of the 
requirements, it is clear that they impose a significant check on 
arbitrary agency behavior. 
The APA also requires an agency “to incorporate in the rules 
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.”208 
The legislative history of this provision “suggests some duty to discuss 
the factual basis for a rule and the reasoning process that links the 
factual predicates to a set of expected effects consistent with one or 
more statutory goals.”209 As the Senate committee stated in its report 
on the APA, “the agency must analyze and consider all relevant 
matter presented. The required statement of the basis and purposes of 
rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with 
reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the 
rule.”210 
When agencies act through the rulemaking process, the courts 
have interpreted these procedural requirements as mandating that 
agencies articulate the basis for the policy choices they adopt. For 
example, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court 
reviewed a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to authorize 
federal funding “for the construction of a six-lane interstate highway 
through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee.”211 The Secretary did 
not, however, issue a statement of his actual findings on “why he 
believed there were no feasible and prudent alternative routes or why 
design changes could not be made to reduce the harm to the park.”212 
Those opposed to the highway argued that, without such formal 
findings, the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA.213 The Supreme Court ruled that, even though the Secretary was 
not required to make formal findings, the post-hoc affidavits 
 
 206.  § 552(a)(1). See also 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 424. 
 207.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 426–41. 
 208.  § 553(c). 
 209.  Id.; 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 441. 
 210.  S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong. 201, 259 (1946). 
 211.  401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971). 
 212.  Id. at 408. 
 213.  Id. Both the Department of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act 
provided that the Secretary “shall not approve any program or project” that requires the use of 
any parkland “unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and 
(2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park.” 23 U.S.C. § 138 
(2012). 
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describing the basis for the Secretary’s decision were inadequate and 
that it was necessary to remand the case to the district court for 
plenary review of the Secretary’s decision based on “the full 
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he 
made his decision.”214 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court elaborated on the holding of 
Overton Park by requiring an administrative explanation for notice 
and comment rulemaking. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s 
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,215 the 
Court reviewed a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
regulation that rescinded a prior rule requiring automobile 
manufacturers to install a passive restraint system in all cars.216 The 
Court held that an agency rule would be  
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view 
or the product of agency expertise.217  
The Court then insisted that the agency itself must provide a reasoned 
basis for its decision in that the “reviewing court should not attempt 
itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned 
basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”218 
Therefore, an agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”219 These cases 
established a procedural regime under which the agencies must 
explain the basis for their decision to adopt a particular rule. 
This regime has been enforced with increasing vigor by the courts. 
As Professor Richard Pierce has noted 
No court today would uphold a major agency rule that 
incorporates only a “concise general statement of basis and 
purpose.” To have any reasonable prospect of obtaining judicial 
affirmance of a major rule, an agency must set forth the basis and 
 
 214.  Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419–20. 
 215.  463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 216.  Id. at 37–38. 
 217.  Id. at 43. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). 
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purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often several hundred 
pages long, in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for 
all factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from factual 
predicates and the expected effects of the rule, relates the factual 
predicates and expected effects of the rule to each of the statutory 
goals or purposes the agency is required to further or to consider, 
responds to all major criticisms contained in the comments on its 
proposed rule, and explains why it has rejected at least some of the 
most plausible alternatives to the rule it has adopted.220 
A number of scholars have criticized the manner in which the 
courts apply this highly specific and detailed requirement.221 First, it 
clearly imposes a great demand on an administrative agency issuing 
even a modest rule.222 In addition, some commentators have argued 
that the test is applied in a manner that is strongly influenced by the 
political or ideological leanings of the judges who review the agency 
action.223 Finally, others have suggested the requirement as elaborated 
by the courts goes beyond Congress’s intent in adopting the APA.224 
Regardless of the criticisms, however, the Court is unlikely to 
backtrack significantly on the imposition of a significant procedural 
burden on an agency to explain the basis and purpose of a proposed 
rule. 
These procedural requirements impose a significant procedural 
check on the executive branch, notwithstanding the increased 
substantive deference that the Supreme Court has accorded agency 
interpretations of statutes through Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.225 Chevron (which has been cited in more 
 
 220.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 442. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the 
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65 
(1989); Patricia Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 507, 528 (1988); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 422–25 (1987). 
 221.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 444. 
 222.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency 
Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63, 94 (2000); 
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 393 
(1986). 
 223.  See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1729−32 (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1066–68 
(1995). 
 224.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 445 (“The courts have replaced the statutory adjectives 
‘concise’ and ‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and ‘encyclopedic.’”); Martin 
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453–54 (1986). 
 225.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
2017] PROCEDURAL CHECKS 257 
cases than any other Supreme Court decision)226 involved a question 
of the proper construction of the term “source” under the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1977.227 There, the Court established a two-step 
process to be used by courts in evaluating whether an agency properly 
interpreted the statute it is charged with administering: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute if silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.228 
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had redefined the 
statutory term at issue in a way that made it less likely that a company 
would be required to undergo the elaborate EPA review process. The 
Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the EPA 
had inappropriately changed its interpretation of the statute. Because 
the language and legislative history of the statute were unclear, the 
definition of that term was a policy decision that should have been 
left to the agency. The Court emphasized that judges “are not part of 
either political branch of the Government.”229 The Court then went 
on to note that 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices – resolving 
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently 
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.230 
Thus, the Court left to agencies the responsibility of resolving 
 
 226.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 140. 
 227.  Pub. L. No. 95–95, 91 Stat. 685. 
 228.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnote omitted). 
 229.  Id. at 865. 
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ambiguous questions of statutory construction. As a result, the courts 
are now required to give much more substantive discretion to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, but the 
procedural checks imposed by the APA remain in place to be 
enforced by the courts. 
When taken together, these requirements imposed by Congress 
and the courts create a set of procedural checks on the exercise of 
executive power that look remarkably similar to the procedural 
checks that the Constitution imposes on the courts and Congress. Just 
as the case or controversy requirement and the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause direct the exercise of judicial and legislative 
power through a “carefully wrought set of procedures,” so too does 
the APA direct the exercise of executive rulemaking authority 
through a similar set of procedures designed to limit arbitrariness and 
curb the potential for abuse of authority. Similarly, just as the case or 
controversy requirement and the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clause leave the courts and Congress free to make whatever 
substantive judgments they believe to be correct in deciding cases or 
adopting legislation, so do the APA and the Supreme Court’s Chevron 
doctrine leave the executive branch substantial room to make 
substantive policy judgments within the limitations imposed by 
Congress. The hole left by the absence of any significant constitutional 
limitations on the procedures by which the executive branch exercises 
its constitutional functions has been filled by Congress, which 
successfully created a detailed set of procedures to restrain the 
exercise of discretion by the executive branch. 
Thus, through the enactment of the APA, Congress has redressed 
the imbalance created by the Supreme Court’s cases concerning the 
ability of Congress to augment statutorily the powers of the respective 
branches. Congress has matched the Court’s strict imposition of 
procedural checks on the courts and Congress. As a result, executive 
authority is constrained in a precisely analogous manner to the way in 
which the Court has restrained the exercise of judicial and legislative 
authority. 
One might ask, however, whether the legislative imposition of 
procedural checks under the APA is the equivalent of constitutional 
doctrines regulating the exercise of judicial and legislative authority. 
After all, notwithstanding the statutory checks created by the APA, 
the executive branch is still unbound by significant constitutional 
checks on the exercise of its delegated authority. Congress remains 
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free to unbind the executive branch in a manner that would be 
impermissible with respect to either the judicial or legislative 
branches. As a practical matter, however, this seems like an 
insignificant risk. We might well worry about the potential for abuse 
of authority if Congress were given constitutional freedom to 
augment its own power to act other than through the bicameralism 
and presentment process. Congress clearly has an incentive to expand 
its own powers and avoid the procedural checks imposed by 
bicameralism and presentment. Conversely, however, Congress has 
little of the same incentive to withdraw the procedural checks 
imposed by the APA on the executive branch. Although Congress 
may have some incentive to pass the buck by delegating difficult 
policy choices to the executive branch, it has good reason to retain the 
checks imposed by the APA, which help to legitimate executive 
branch lawmaking. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESS’S POWER TO IMPOSE 
PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Congress’s power to redress the constitutional asymmetry with 
respect to the procedural checks on the power of the branches has a 
number of normative implications for some major issues of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation. First, it means that both scholars 
and the courts should be sensitive to the role of the APA as an 
executive-branch analogue to the case or controversy and 
bicameralism and presentment requirements. Although early theories 
of the administrative state focused on the need to enforce procedures 
to limit the arbitrariness of executive-branch decision-making, later 
scholarship has focused on the importance of executive accountability 
in legitimating the administrative decision-making process.231 Under 
this approach, ensuring that the President is held politically 
accountable for agency action should be sufficient to prevent the 
executive branch from abusing its authority. Accountability alone, 
however, is insufficient to legitimate the administrative state; the 
courts must interpret the APA so as to prevent the arbitrary exercise 
of delegated executive authority.232 Understanding the importance of 
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the APA as an executive-branch analogue to the constitutionally 
imposed procedural checks on the arbitrary exercise of judicial and 
congressional power supports this approach to administrative law and 
suggests that the courts should be aggressive about ensuring that 
administrative agencies comply with the procedures designed to 
protect against arbitrariness. 
Second, Congress’s power to impose procedural checks on the 
executive branch means that, as a practical matter, we need not worry 
about the apparent asymmetry of cases restricting the power of 
Congress to expand the powers of the branches. It may be true that 
the Court has, in effect, read the Constitution to impose 
comprehensive procedural checks on the courts and Congress while 
leaving the executive branch, with limited exceptions, unrestricted by 
similar procedural checks. Nevertheless, Congress’s power to fill the 
gap left by the Supreme Court and impose a congruent set of 
procedural checks on the exercise of power delegated to the executive 
branch more than adequately addresses any worries about the 
constitutional asymmetry. These checks operate to constrain the 
arbitrary exercise of authority by the executive branch in essentially 
the same way that the case or controversy limitations check the 
federal courts and the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause check 
the Congress. 
Moreover, where the Constitution may be read to impose limited 
procedural checks on the executive branch, as in the case of the line 
item veto, the Court has stepped in to prevent any effort to 
circumvent those procedural checks. As a result, the asymmetry of 
procedural checks is more apparent than real. Each of the branches is 
now required to exercise its authority in accordance with procedures 
designed to avoid abuses of its authority. The executive branch, no less 
than Congress and the courts, must live within clear procedural 
guidelines when exercising its authority under the Constitution and 
statutes. 
Thus, the critics of the Supreme Court’s separation of powers 
jurisprudence233 have exaggerated the arguments against cases like 
Chadha, Bowsher, and Buckley. There is no need to abandon the 
procedural checks on Congress and the courts in order to allow those 
branches to recapture authority from the executive branch or redress 
an imbalance in the separation of powers. Congress has delegated 
 
 233.  See Elliott, supra note 7; Strauss, supra note 7. 
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substantial regulatory authority to the executive branch, but that 
authority must be exercised in accordance with procedural checks that 
accomplish the same objective as the procedural checks imposed by 
the Constitution on Congress and the courts. Congress itself has 
redressed the apparent imbalance, and it is unlikely ever to abandon 
these congressionally imposed procedural checks. 
Third, the importance of congressionally imposed procedural 
checks in redressing the asymmetry of constitutionally imposed 
checks on the branches has important implications for issues involving 
the constitutionality of statutes that purport to specify the procedures 
that must be followed by the executive branch. Because the legitimacy 
of the constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the courts and 
Congress depends on the power of Congress to impose analogous 
checks on the executive branch, Congress must be given wide latitude 
to determine what are the most appropriate and effective ways in 
which to regulate the procedures used to implement the power 
delegated to the executive branch. 
This conclusion calls into question the broad claims of those who 
advocate a unitary executive theory that rejects the legitimacy of 
congressionally imposed checks on how the President exercises 
executive power.234 In particular, it undermines the extreme form of 
the unitary executive theory adopted by the George W. Bush 
administration. As noted earlier, the Bush administration routinely 
issued signing statements in which the President asserted that 
procedural requirements imposed by a newly enacted statute were 
inconsistent with the President’s powers under Article II.235 The 
President’s claims of immunity from the congressional imposition of 
procedural checks on his delegated power are inconsistent with the 
broad congressional authority that is necessary to redress the 
asymmetry of constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the 
powers of the branches. Congress has power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to regulate how the executive branch performs the 
functions delegated by statute to the executive branch. Without that 
authority, Congress would be unable to impose the procedural checks 
 
 234.  See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The 
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 604 (2005) (Scholarly debate 
has focused on whether the Constitution created a ‘unitary executive’ in which all executive 
authority is centralized in the President, rather than the ‘executive by committee’ that existed 
under the Articles of Confederation.”). 
 235.  See generally SAVAGE, supra note 50; Biller, supra note 50; Shane, supra note 50; 
Kinkopf, supra note 50. 
PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018 1:48 PM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
that are necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of executive 
authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The conceptual muddle created by the Supreme Court’s 
separation of powers cases can be substantially simplified by 
reconceptualizing the limitations imposed on Congress’s power to 
augment the inherent powers of the three branches. In cases involving 
the expansion of the authority of the federal courts, the case or 
controversy requirement contained in Article III, Section 2, of the 
Constitution imposes a procedural check on the form in which the 
federal courts exercise their constitutional authority. Congress may 
not circumvent these checks by statutorily granting the courts the 
power to act substantively other than in the context of a genuine case 
or controversy. 
A similar procedural check governs many of the cases dealing 
with the statutes augmenting Congress’s authority. Although the 
reasoning of the Court’s decisions may not expressly identify this 
procedural check, the effect of the Chadha, Bowsher, and Washington 
Metropolitan Airport Authority decisions is to ensure that Congress 
cannot act substantively to affect the rights of anyone outside the 
legislative branch other than through the procedures set forth in the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of the Constitution. These 
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the exercise of judicial 
and legislative power provide significant safeguards against the abuse 
or arbitrary exercise of those powers. 
The Constitution does not, however, provide an analogous 
comprehensive procedural check on the power exercised by the 
executive branch. As a result, many scholars worry that the Court’s 
separation of powers jurisprudence is dangerously imbalanced. They 
argue that the procedural checks imposed on Congress in cases like 
Chadha and Bowsher are shortsighted because they ignore the need 
for Congress to readjust the balance of power, tipped too far toward 
the executive branch, as a result of the massive delegations of 
authority to the President and his subordinates in the executive 
branch. For these scholars, the formalistic limitations of Chadha and 
Bowsher and Washington Metropolitan Airport Authority ignore the 
realities of the modern administrative state and exacerbate the shift of 
power in favor of the executive branch. 
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For a number of reasons, however, this apparent asymmetry 
should not cause us great concern. First, the Supreme Court has 
recognized constitutionally imposed procedural checks that apply to 
at least some areas of executive power. These checks include the Due 
Process requirements that apply with respect to certain vested 
government entitlements, the restrictions on the line item veto and 
the need for Article III judicial review of the decisions of Article I 
courts in the executive branch. 
Second, and more importantly, Congress has stepped in to fill the 
void left by the Constitution by statutorily imposing procedural 
checks on the exercise of executive power that are analogous to the 
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the federal courts and 
Congress. The requirements of the APA and similar statutes channel 
the exercise of executive power through a set of procedures that 
protect against the arbitrary and abusive exercise of delegated power. 
As a result, these statutes comprehensively redress the imbalance of 
constitutionally imposed procedural checks and protect against the 
abuse of power by the executive branch. 
The normative significance of these conclusions is three-fold. First, 
the conclusions lend support to those who argue for an interpretation 
of the APA that enhances the protection against arbitrary decision-
making. Second, the scholarly critiques of cases like Chadha and 
Bowsher no longer carry much weight. Instead, these cases become 
part of a set of constitutional and administrative law principles that 
protect against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power through 
the imposition of procedural checks on the exercise of all 
governmental authority. Finally, the constitutional importance of 
Congress’s power to impose procedural checks on the executive 
branch blunts the force of those who argue for a strong unitary 
executive theory that would preclude Congress from regulation 
executive branch functions. 
 
